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ABSTRACT
Fully automated trading, such as e-procurement, using the Internet is virtually unheard of today. To fully automate the trading
process agents need access to information from the market, the market environment and from general news sources. Here
informed trading agents are built on a synthesis of the two technologies: data mining, and intelligent agents. This paper
describes a demonstrable prototype e-trading system that is populated with informed agents and is available on the World Wide
Web. This is part of a larger project that aims to make informed automated trading a reality.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The potential size of the electronic business market and the comparatively small amount of automated negotiation
presently deployed provides a major incentive for research in automated trading. Fully automated trading, such
as e-procurement, using the Internet is virtually unheard of today. Trading involves the maintenance of effective
business relationships, and is the complete process of: need identification, product brokering, supplier brokering,
offer-exchange, contract negotiation, and contract execution. Two core technologies are fused to create informed
trading agents:
• data mining — real-time data mining technology to tap information flows from the marketplace and the World
Wide Web, and to deliver timely information at the right granularity.
• trading agents — intelligent agents that are designed to operate in tandem with the real-time information flows
received from the data mining systems.
This paper describes informed agents that integrate these two technologies. The work described here augments
conventional plan-based agent architectures — it is not intended to replace them. Our agents have goals and plans,
although those goals may not be utilitarian. This work describes how an agent may deal with real-time information
flows that deliver information with decaying integrity. It provides a basis for proactive information acquisition
to reduce uncertainty in the agent’s world model. The actions of the agent are then managed in a conventional
way in a BDI architecture that incorporates the world model. The e-Market Framework is available on the World
Wide Web1. This project aims to make informed automated trading a reality, and develops further the “Curious
Negotiator” framework (Simoff & Debenham 2002). This work does not address all of the issues in automated
trading. For example, the work relies on developments in: XML and semantic web, secure data exchange, value
chain management and financial services.
The data mining systems that have been developed for mining information both from a virtual institution
and from general sources from the World Wide Web are described in Sec. 2. Intelligent agent that are built on
an architecture designed specifically to handle real-time information flows are described in Sec. 3. Our work on
virtual institutions has been carried out in collaboration with “Institut d’Investigacio en Intel.ligencia Artificial2”,
Spanish Scientific Research Council, UAB, Barcelona, Spain. Sec. 4 concludes.
2 DATA MINING
We have designed information discovery and delivery agents that utilise text and network data mining for sup-
porting real-time negotiation. This work has addressed the central issues of extracting relevant information from
different on-line repositories with different formats, with possible duplicative and erroneous data. That is, we have
1http://e-markets.org.au
2http://www.iiia.csic.es/
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addressed the central issues in extracting information from the World Wide Web. Our mining agents understand
the influence that extracted information has on the subject of negotiation and takes that in account.
Real-time embedded data mining is an essential component of the proposed framework. In this framework
the trading agents make their informed decisions, based on utilising two types of information:
• information extracted from the negotiation process (i.e. from the exchange of offers), and;
• information from external sources, extracted and provided in condensed form.
The embedded data mining system provides the information extracted from the external sources. The sys-
tem complements and services the information-based architecture developed in (Debenham 2004b) and (Sierra &
Debenham 2005). The information request and the information delivery format is defined by the interaction on-
tology. As these agents operate with negotiation parameters with a discrete set of feasible values, the information
request is formulated in terms of these values. As agents proceed with negotiation they have a topic of negotiation
and a shared ontology that describes that topic. For example, if the topic of negotiation is buying a number of
digital cameras for a University, the shared ontology will include the product model of the camera, and some char-
acteristics, like “product reputation” (which on their own can be a list of parameters), that are usually derived from
additional sources (for example, from different opinions in a professional community of photographers or digital
artists). As the information-based architecture assumes that negotiation parameters are discrete, the information
request can be formulated as a subset of the range of values for a negotiation parameter. For example, if the negoti-
ator is interested in cameras with 8 megapixel resolution, and the brand is a negotiation parameter, the information
request can be formulated as a set of camera models, e.g. {“Canon Power Shot Pro 1”, “Sony f828”, “Konica Min-
olta Dimage A2”, “Nikon Coolpix 8400”, “Olympus C-8080”} and a preference estimate based on the information
in the different articles available. The collection of parameter sets of the negotiation topic constitutes the input to
the data mining system. Continuous numerical values are replaced by finite number of ranges of interest.
The data mining system initially constructs data sets that are “focused” on requested information. From the
vast amount of information available in electronic form, we need to filter the information that is relevant to the
information request. In our example, this will be the news, opinions, comments, white papers related to the five
models of digital cameras. Technically, the automatic retrieval of the information pieces utilises the universal news
bot architecture presented in (Zhang & Simoff 2004). Developed originally for news sites only, the approach is
currently being extended to discussion boards and company white papers.
The “focused” data set is dynamically constructed in an iterative process. The data mining agent constructs
the news data set according to the concepts in the query. Each concept is represented as a cluster of key terms
(a term can include one or more words), defined by the proximity position of the frequent key terms. On each
iteration the most frequent (terms) from the retrieved data set are extracted and considered to be related to the same
concept. The extracted keywords are resubmitted to the search engine. The process of query submission, data
retrieval and keyword extraction is repeated until the search results start to derail from the given topic.
The set of topics in the original request is used as a set of class labels. In our example we are interested in
the evidence in support of each particular model camera model. A simple solution is for each model to introduce
two labels — positive opinion and negative opinion, ending with ten labels. In the constructed “focused” data set,
each news article is labelled with one of the values from this set of labels. An automated approach reported in
(Zhang & Simoff 2004) extends the tree-based approach proposed in (Reis, et al. 2004).
The data sets required further automatic preprocessing, related to possible redundancies in the information
encoded in the set that can bias the analysis algorithms. For example, identifying a set of opinions about the camera
that most likely comes from the same author, though it has been retrieved from different “opinion boards” on the
Internet.
Once the set is constructed, building the “advising model” is reduced to a classification data mining prob-
lem. As the model is communicated back to the information-based agent architecture, the classifier output should
include all the possible class labels with an attached probability estimates for each class. Hence, we use probab-
ilistic classifiers (e.g. Naı¨ve Bayes, Bayesian Network classifiers (Berthold & Hand 2003) without the min-max
selection of the class output [e.g., in a classifier based on Naı¨ve Bayes algorithm, we calculate the posterior prob-
ability Pp(i) of each class c(i) with respect to combinations of key terms and then return the tuples < c(i),Pp(i) >
for all classes, not just the one with maximum Pp(i). In the case when we deal with range variables the data mining
system returns the range within which is the estimated value. For example, the response to a request for an estimate
of the rate of change between two currencies over specified period of time will be done in three steps: (i) the relat-
ive focused news data set will be updated for the specified period; (ii) the model that takes these news in account
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is updated, and; (iii) the output of the model is compared with requested ranges and the matching one is returned.
The details of this part of the data mining system are presented in (Zhang, et al. 2005). The currently used model
is a modified linear model with an additional term that incorporates a news index Inews, which reflects the news
effect on exchange rate. The data mining system provides parameters that define the “quality of the information”,
including:
• the time span of the focused data set, defined by the eldest and the latest information unit);
• estimates of the characteristics of the information sources, including reliability, trust and cost, that then are
used by the information-based agent architecture.
Overall the parameters that will be estimated by the mining algorithms and provided to the negotiating agents
are expected to allow information-based agents to devise more effective and better informed situated strategies.
In addition to the data coming from external sources, the data mining component of the project will develop
techniques for analysing agent behaviourist data with respect to the electronic institution setup.
3 TRADING AGENTS
We have designed a new agent architecture founded on information theory. These “information-based” agents
operate in real-time in response to market information flows. We have addressed the central issues of trust in the
execution of contracts, and the reliability of information (Sierra & Debenham 2005). Our agents understand the
value of building business relationships as a foundation for reliable trade. An inherent difficulty in automated
trading — including e-procurement — is that it is generally multi-issue. Even a simple trade, such as a quantity of
steel, may involve: delivery date, settlement terms, as well as price and the quality of the steel. The “information-
based” agent’s reasoning is based on a first-order logic world model that manages multi-issue negotiation as easily
as single-issue.
Most of the work on multi-issue negotiation has focussed on one-to-one bargaining — for example (Faratin,
et al. 2003). There has been rather less interest in one-to-many, multi-issue auctions — (Debenham 2004a)
analyzes some possibilities — despite the size of the e-procurement market which typically attempts to extend
single-issue, reverse auctions to the multi-issue case by post-auction haggling. There has been even less interest in
many-to-many, multi-issue exchanges.
The generic architecture of our “information-based” agents is presented in Sec. 3.1. The agent’s reasoning
employs entropy-based inference and is described in Sec. 3.2. The integrity of the agent’s information is in a
permanent state of decay, Sec. 3.3 describes the agent’s machinery for managing this decay leading to a charac-
terization of the “value” of information. Sec. 3.4 describes metrics that bring order and structure to the agent’s
information with the aim of supporting its management.
3.1 Information-Based Agent Architecture
The essence of “information-based agency” is now described. An agent observes events in its environment in-
cluding what other agents actually do. It chooses to represent some of those observations in its world model as
beliefs. As time passes, an agent may not be prepared to accept such beliefs as being “true”, and qualifies those
representations with epistemic probabilities. Those qualified representations of prior observations are the agent’s
information. This information is primitive — it is the agent’s representation of its beliefs about prior events in the
environment and about the other agents prior actions. It is independent of what the agent is trying to achieve, or
what the agent believes the other agents are trying to achieve. Given this information, an agent may then choose
to adopt goals and strategies. Those strategies may be based on game theory, for example. To enable the agent’s
strategies to make good use of its information, tools from information theory are applied to summarize and process
that information. Such an agent is called information-based.
An agent called Π is the subject of this discussion. Π engages in multi-issue negotiation with a set of other
agents: {Ω1, · · · ,Ωo}. The foundation for Π’s operation is the information that is generated both by and because
of its negotiation exchanges. Any message from one agent to another reveals information about the sender. Π
also acquires information from the environment — including general information sources —to support its actions.
Π uses ideas from information theory to process and summarize its information. Π’s aim may not be “utility
optimization” — it may not be aware of a utility function. If Π does know its utility function and if it aims to
optimize its utility then Π may apply the principles of game theory to achieve its aim. The information-based
approach does not to reject utility optimization — in general, the selection of a goal and strategy is secondary to
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the processing and summarizing of the information.
In addition to the information derived from its opponents, Π has access to a set of information sources
{Θ1, · · · ,Θt} that may include the marketplace in which trading takes place, and general information sources
such as news-feeds accessed via the Internet. Together, Π, {Ω1, · · · ,Ωo} and {Θ1, · · · ,Θt} make up a multiagent
system. The integrity of Π’s information, including information extracted from the Internet, will decay in time.
The way in which this decay occurs will depend on the type of information, and on the source from which it
was drawn. Little appears to be known about how the integrity of real information, such as news-feeds, decays,
although its validity can often be checked — “Is company X taking over company Y?” — by proactive action given
a cooperative information source Θj . So Π has to consider how and when to refresh its decaying information.
Π has two languages: C and L. C is an illocutionary-based language for communication. L is a first-order
language for internal representation — precisely it is a first-order language with sentence probabilities optionally
attached to each sentence representing Π’s epistemic belief in the truth of that sentence. Messages expressed in
C from {Θi} and {Ωi} are received, time-stamped, source-stamped and placed in an in-box X . The messages in
X are then translated using an import function I into sentences expressed in L that have integrity decay functions
(usually of time) attached to each sentence, they are stored in a repository Yt. And that is all that happens until Π
triggers a goal.
Π triggers a goal, g ∈ G, in two ways: first in response to a message received from an opponent {Ωi}
“I offer you e1 in exchange for an apple”, and second in response to some need, ν ∈ N , “goodness, we’ve
run out of coffee”. In either case, Π is motivated by a need — either a need to strike a deal with a particular
feature (such as acquiring coffee) or a general need to trade. Π’s goals could be short-term such as obtaining
some information “what is the time?”, medium-term such as striking a deal with one of its opponents, or, rather
longer-term such as building a (business) relationship with one of its opponents. So Π has a trigger mechanism T
where: T : {X ∪ N} → G.
For each goal that Π commits to, it has a mechanism, G, for selecting a strategy to achieve it where G :
G×M→ S where S is the strategy library. A strategy s maps an information base into an action, s(Yt) = z ∈ Z .
Given a goal, g, and the current state of the social model mt, a strategy: s = G(g,mt). Each strategy, s, consists of
a plan, bs and a world model (construction and revision) function, Js, that constructs, and maintains the currency
of, the strategy’s world model W ts that consists of a set of probability distributions. A plan derives the agent’s
next action, z, on the basis of the agent’s world model for that strategy and the current state of the social model:
z = bs(W ts ,m
t), and z = s(Yt). Js employs two forms of entropy-based inference:
• Maximum entropy inference, J+s , first constructs an information base Its as a set of sentences expressed
in L derived from Yt, and then from Its constructs the world model, W ts , as a set of complete probability
distributions [using Eqn. 2 in Sec. 3.2 below].
• Given a prior world model, Wus , where u < t, minimum relative entropy inference, J−s , first constructs the
incremental information base I(u,t)s of sentences derived from those in Yt that were received between time
u and time t, and then from Wus and I(u,t)s constructs a new world model, W ts [using Eqn. 3 in Sec. 3.2
below].
3.2 Π’s Reasoning
Once Π has selected a plan a ∈ A it uses maximum entropy inference to derive the {Dsi }ni=1 and minimum
relative entropy inference to update those distributions as new data becomes available. Entropy, H, is a meas-
ure of uncertainty (MacKay 2003) in a probability distribution for a discrete random variable X: H(X) ,
−∑i p(xi) log p(xi) where p(xi) = P(X = xi). Maximum entropy inference is used to derive sentence prob-
abilities for that which is not known by constructing the “maximally noncommittal” (Jaynes 2003) probability
distribution, and is chosen for its ability to generate complete distributions from sparse data.
Let G be the set of all positive ground literals that can be constructed using Π’s language L. A possible
world, v, is a valuation function: G → {>,⊥}. V|Ks = {vi} is the set of all possible worlds that are consistent with
Π’s knowledge baseKs that contains statements which Π believes are true. A random world forKs, W |Ks = {pi}
is a probability distribution over V|Ks = {vi}, where pi expresses Π’s degree of belief that each of the possible
worlds, vi, is the actual world. The derived sentence probability of any σ ∈ L, with respect to a random world
W |Ks is:
(∀σ ∈ L)P{W |Ks}(σ) ,
∑
n
{ pn : σ is> in vn } (1)
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The agent’s belief set Bst = {Ωj}Mj=1 contains statements to which Π attaches a given sentence probability B(.). A
random world W |Ks is consistent with Bst if: (∀Ω ∈ Bst )(B(Ω) = P{W |Ks}(Ω)). Let {pi} = {W |Ks,Bst } be the
“maximum entropy probability distribution over V|Ks that is consistent with Bst ”. Given an agent with Ks and Bst ,
maximum entropy inference states that the derived sentence probability for any sentence, σ ∈ L, is:
(∀σ ∈ L)P{W |Ks,Bst}(σ) ,
∑
n
{ pn : σ is> in vn } (2)
From Eqn. 2, each belief imposes a linear constraint on the {pi}. The maximum entropy distribution: argmaxpH(p),




cjipi − B(Ωj) = 0, j = 1, . . . ,M. g0(p) =
N∑
i=1
pi − 1 = 0
where cji = 1 if Ωj is > in vi and 0 otherwise, and pi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N , is found by introducing Lagrange multi-
pliers, and then obtaining a numerical solution using the multivariate Newton-Raphson method. In the subsequent
subsections we’ll see how an agent updates the sentence probabilities depending on the type of information used
in the update.
Given a prior probability distribution q = (qi)ni=1 and a set of constraints C, the principle of minimum
relative entropy chooses the posterior probability distribution p = (pi)ni=1 that has the least relative entropy3 with
respect to q:







and that satisfies the constraints. This may be found by introducing Lagrange multipliers as above. Given a prior
distribution q over {vi} — the set of all possible worlds, and a set of constraints C (that could have been derived
as above from a set of new beliefs) minimum relative entropy inference states that the derived sentence probability
for any sentence, σ ∈ L, is:
(∀σ ∈ L)P{W |q,C}(σ) ,
∑
n
{ pn : σ is> in vn } (3)
where {pi} = {W |q, C}. The principle of minimum relative entropy is a generalization of the principle of max-
imum entropy. If the prior distribution q is uniform, then the relative entropy of p with respect to q, p‖q, differs
from −H(p) only by a constant. So the principle of maximum entropy is equivalent to the principle of minimum
relative entropy with a uniform prior distribution.
3.3 The agent manages information
The illocutions in the communication language C include information, [info]. The information received from
general information sources will be expressed in terms defined by Π’s ontology. We assume that Π makes at least
part of that ontology public so that the other agents {Ω1, . . . ,Ωo} may communicate [info] that Π can understand.
Ω’s reliability is an estimate of the extent to which this [info] is correct. For example, Ω may send Π the [info] that
“the price of fish will go up by 10% next week”, and it may actually go up by 9%.
The only restriction on incoming [info] is that it is expressed in terms of the ontology — this is very
general. However, the way in which [info] is used is completely specific — it will be represented as a set of linear
constraints on one or more probability distributions. A chunk of [info] may not be directly related to one of Π’s
chosen distributions or may not be expressed naturally as constraints, and so some inference machinery is required
to derive these constraints — this inference is performed by model building functions, Js, that have been activated
by a plan s chosen by Π. JDs ([info]) denotes the set of constraints on distribution D derived by Js from [info].
3.3.1 Updating the world model with [info]
The procedure for updating the world model as [info] is received follows. If at time u, Π receives a message
containing [info] it is time-stamped and source-stamped [info](Ω,Π,u), and placed in a repository Yt. If Π has an
active plan, s, with model building function, Js, then Js is applied to [info](Ω,Π,u) to derive constraints on some,
3Otherwise called cross entropy or the Kullback-Leibler distance between the two probability distributions.
ISBN: 972-8924-16-X © 2006 IADIS
464
or none, of Π’s distributions. The extent to which those constraints are permitted to effect the distributions is
determined by a value for the reliability of Ω, Rt(Π,Ω, O([info])), where O([info]) is the ontological context of
[info].
An agent may have models of integrity decay for some particular distributions, but general models of
integrity decay for, say, a chunk of information taken at random from the World Wide Web are generally unknown.
However the values to which decaying integrity should tend in time are often known. For example, a prior value
for the truth of the proposition that a “22 year-old male will default on credit card repayment” is well known
to banks. If Π attaches such prior values to a distribution D they are called the decay limit distribution for D,
(dDi )
n
i=1. No matter how integrity of [info] decays, in the absence of any other relevant information it should decay
to the decay limit distribution. If a distribution with n values has no decay limit distribution then integrity decays
to the maximum entropy value 1n . In other words, the maximum entropy distribution is the default decay limit
distribution.
In the absence of new [info] the integrity of distributions decays. If D = (qi)ni=1 then we use a geometric
model of decay:
qt+1i = (1− ρD)× dDi + ρD × qti , for i = 1, . . . , n (4)
where ρD ∈ (0, 1) is the decay rate. This raises the question of how to determine ρD. Just as an agent may know
the decay limit distribution it may also know something about ρD. In the case of an information-overfed agent
there is no harm in conservatively setting ρD “a bit on the low side” as the continually arriving [info] will sustain
the estimate for D.
We now describe how new [info] is imported to the distributions. A single chunk of [info] may effect a
number of distributions. Suppose that a chunk of [info] is received from Ω and that Π attaches the epistemic





i is the probability that the possible world ωi for D is the true world for D. The effect that a chunk
[info] has on distribution D is to enforce the set of linear constraints on D, JDs ([info]). If the constraints JDs ([info])
are taken by Π as valid then Π could update D to the posterior distribution (p[info]i )ni=1 that is the distribution with
least relative entropy with respect to (qti)ni=1 satisfying the constraint:∑
i
{p[info]i : JDs ([info]) are all > in ωi} = 1. (5)
But Rt(Π,Ω, O([info])) = r ∈ [0, 1] and Π should only treat the JDs ([info]) as valid if r = 1. In general r
determines the extent to which the effect of [info] on D is closer to (p[info]i )ni=1 or to the prior (qti)ni=1 distribution
by:
pti = r × p[info]i + (1− r)× qti (6)
But, we should only permit a new chunk of [info] to influence D if doing so gives us new information. For
example, if 5 minutes ago a trusted agent advises Π that the interest rate will go up by 1%, and 1 minute ago a
very unreliable agent advises Π that the interest rate may go up by 0.5%, then the second unreliable chunk should
not be permitted to ‘overwrite’ the first. We capture this by only permitting a new chunk of [info] to be imported if
the resulting distribution has more information relative to the decay limit distribution than the existing distribution













In addition, we have described in Eqn. 4 how the integrity of each distribution D will decay in time. Combining
these two into one result, distribution D is revised to:
qt+1i =
{
(1− ρD)× dDi + ρD × pti if usable [info] is received at time t
(1− ρD)× dDi + ρD × qti otherwise
for i = 1, · · · , n, and decay rate ρD as before. We have yet to estimate Rt(Π,Ω, O([info])) — that is described in
Sec. 3.3.2 following.
4This is just one criterion for determining whether the [info] should be used.
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3.3.2 Information reliability
We estimate Rt(Π,Ω, O([info])) by measuring the error in information. Π’s plans will have constructed a set of
distributions. We measure the ‘error’ in information as the error in the effect that information has on each of Π’s
distributions. Suppose that a chunk of [info] is received from agent Ω at time s and is verified at some later time t.
For example, a chunk of information could be “the interest rate will rise by 0.5% next week”, and suppose that the
interest rate actually rises by 0.25% — call that correct information [fact]. What does all this tell agent Π about
agent Ω’s reliability? Consider one of Π’s distributions D that is {qsi } at time s. Let (p[info]i )ni=1 be the minimum
relative entropy distribution given that [info] has been received as calculated in Eqn. 5, and let (p[fact]i )ni=1 be that
distribution if [fact] had been received instead. Suppose that the reliability estimate for distribution D was RsD.
This section is concerned with what RsD should have been in the light of knowing now, at time t, that [info] should
have been [fact], and how that knowledge effects our current reliability estimate for D, Rt(Π,Ω, O([info])).
The idea of Eqn. 6, is that the current value of r should be such that, on average, (psi )ni=1 will be seen to
be “close to” (p[fact]i )ni=1 when we eventually discover [fact] — no matter whether or not [info] was used to update
D, as determined by the acceptability test in Eqn. 7 at time s. That is, given [info], [fact] and the prior (qsi )ni=1,




i=1 using Eqn. 5. Then the observed reliability for distribution D, R
([info]|[fact])
D ,
on the basis of the verification of [info] with [fact] is the value of r that minimises the Kullback-Leibler distance









(r · p[info]i + (1− r) · qsi ) log




If E[info] is the set of distributions that [info] effects, then the overall observed reliability on the basis of the verific-
ation of [info] with [fact] is: R([info]|[fact]) = 1− (maxD∈E[info] |1−R([info]|[fact])D |). Then for each ontological context
oj , at time t when, perhaps, a chunk of [info], with O([info]) = ok, may have been verified with [fact]:
Rt+1(Π,Ω, oj) = (1− ρ)×Rt(Π,Ω, oj) + ρ×R([info]|[fact]) × Sem(oj , ok)
where Sem(·, ·) : O × O → [0, 1] measures the semantic distance between two sections of the ontology, and ρ is
the learning rate. Over time, Π notes the ontological context of the various chunks of [info] received from Ω and
over the various ontological contexts calculates the relative frequency, P t(oj), of these contexts, oj = O([info]).






A chunk of information is valued first by the way that it enables Π to do something. So information is valued
in relation to the strategies that Π is executing. A strategy, s, is chosen for a particular goal g in the context of
a particular representation, or environment, e. One way in which a chunk of information assists Π is by altering
s’s world model W ts . A model W ts consists of a set of probability distributions: W ts = {Dts,i}ni=1. As a chunk
of information could be “good” for one distribution and “bad” for another, we first value information by its effect
on each distribution. For a model W ts , the value to W ts of a message received at time t is the resulting decrease
in entropy in the distributions {Dts,i}. In general, suppose that a set of stamped messages X = {xi} is received
in X . The information in X at time t with respect to a particular distribution Dts,i ∈ W ts , strategy s, goal g and
environment e is:
I(X | Dts,i, s, g, e) , H(Dts,i(Yt))−H(Dts,i(Yt ∪ I(X)))
for i = 1, · · · , n, where the argument of theDts,i(·) is the state of Π’s repository from whichDts,i was derived. The
environment e could be determined by a need ν (if the evaluation is made in the context of a particular negotiation)
or a relationship ρ (in a broader context). It is reasonable to aggregate the information in X over the distributions
used by s. That is, the information in X at time t with respect to strategy s, goal g and environment e is:
I(X | s, g, e) ,
∑
i
I(X | Dts,i, s, g, e)
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and to aggregate again over all strategies to obtain the value of the information in a statement. That is, the value of
the information in X with respect to goal g and environment e is:
I(X | g, e) ,
∑
s∈S(g)
P(s) · I(X | s, g, e)
where P(s) is a distribution over the set of strategies for goal g, S(g), denoting the probability that strategy s will
be chosen for goal g based on historic frequency data. and to aggregate again over all goals to obtain the (potential)
information in a statement. That is, the potential information in X with respect to environment e is:
I(X | e) ,
∑
g∈G
P(g) · I(X | g, e) (8)
where P(g) is a distribution over G denoting the probability that strategy g will be triggered based on historic
frequency data.
4 CONCLUSIONS
A demonstrable prototype e-Market system permits both human and software agents to trade with each other on the
World Wide Web. The main contributions described are: the broadly-based and “focussed” data mining systems,
and the intelligent agent architecture founded on information theory. These two technologies combine to present
our vision of the trading agent of tomorrow.
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